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Abstract—Administrative Role Based Access Control
(ARBAC) models specify how to manage user-role as-
signments (URA), permission-role assignments (PRA), and
role-role assignments (RRA). There are many approaches
proposed for URA, PRA, and RRA in the literature. In
this paper, we propose a model for an attribute-based role-
role assignment (ARRA), a novel way to unify prior RRA
approaches. We leverage the idea that attributes of various
RBAC entities such as admin users and regular roles can
be used to administer RRA in a highly flexible manner. We
demonstrate that ARRA can express and unify prior RRA
models.
Index Terms—Roles, Role Hierarchy, RBAC, ARBAC,
Access Control, Administration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) [1], [2] model
is well studied in academia [3] and well adopted in
the industry [4]. In RBAC, assignment of users and
permissions to roles allows users to execute permissions
by activating roles.
Administrative RBAC (ARBAC), which involves in
user-role assignment and revocation (URA), permission-
role assignment and revocation (PRA), and role-role
assignment and revocation (RRA), is a challenging
task [5]. ARBAC has been well explored [5]–[9]. All
of these works explore URA and PRA. However, only
few cover RRA [5], [8]. Each of these models use fixed
set of properties in making assignment decisions. For
example, in RRA97 [5], an admin role is given admin
authority over set of roles called role range, where admin
role can perform role assignment.
Recently, Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) has
gained popularity because of its flexibility [10]–[13].
ABAC has also proven its ability to represent different
access control models [12]. However, it has rarely been
used in administration of RBAC.
We have previously developed models for attribute-
based user-role assignment (AURA) and attribute-based
permission-role assignment (ARPA), collectively called
the Attribute-Based Administration of Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (AARBAC)*. A detailed technical report is
presented in [14]. In this paper we present our model for
attribute-based role-role assignment (ARRA), a follow-
up work on AARBAC [14]. ARRA is driven by our
objective to design attribute-based model that allows
us to express features from previous RRA models and
more. For example, it allows us to express features as a
combination of two prior models, and in addition allows
us to add new features. Thus, this work is motivated
mainly by two critical factors: (a) an objective to build
a coherent model, which can be configured to express
prior models and more (b) build a unified model that can
be referenced for various desirable security properties,
which can provide a single codebase to express prior
models and beyond. The contributions of this paper are
as follows:
• We develop an attribute-based administrative model
for role-role assignment (ARRA).
• We demonstrate that ARRA is capable of express-
ing prior approaches to RRA such as RRA97 [5]
and UARBAC’s RRA [8].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we discuss related work. In Section III,
ARRA model is presented. Section IV presents algo-
rithms that translate prior RRA instances into equivalent
ARRA instances. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Among many prominent works done for ARBAC [5]–
[9], ARBAC97 [5] and UARBAC [8] present role-role
assignment (RRA) as part of their model. In RRA97,
a set of roles in the hierarchy called authority range is
given to an admin role for decentralized administration.
An authority range must be an encapsulated range [5].
A user with admin role can perform operations like
inserting an edge or creating a role in her authority range.
UARBAC redefines RBAC model with class objects.
UARBAC’s RRA deals with assigning/revoking role-role
on the basis of admin user’s authority over individual
roles specified by access modes. Class level permissions
*Article “AARBAC: Attribute-Based Administration of Role-Based Access Control” is published at the IEEE CIC 2017 Conference.
in UARBAC allows an admin user to conduct an opera-
tion over every object of a class.
In both of these models, the policy for assigning a
role to a role is based on a fixed set of properties of
the entities such as admin role, admin user and regular
roles, involved in assignment process.
Crampton et. al [15] present models for RRA with
administrative scopes. Admin scopes are plausible ap-
proach for role hierarchy operations in RBAC. However,
admin scopes may not be intuitive to express as a role
attribute. Many literature [10], [16], [17] present benefits
of integrating attributes into an RBAC operational model.
An operational model deals with making decisions on
user’s access request for objects. There are many works
on operational aspects of ABAC [11], [12], [18], [19].
In contrast, ARRA is an administrative model that uses
attributes of RBAC entities for assigning/revoking roles.
III. ARRA MODEL
In this section, we present our approach for attribute-
based role-role assignment (ARRA). Inspired by prior
RRA models we have included attributes for admin
users, admin roles and regular roles. Based on which,
decisions on assigning a role to a role is made.
Table I presents formal ARRA model. The entities in-
volved in ARRA comprise of admin users (AU), regular
roles (ROLES) and their hierarchy (RH), admin roles
(AR) and their hierarchy (ARH), admin user to admin
role relation (AUA) and admin operations (AOP).
In ARRA, admin user in AU wants to perform admin
operation such as assign or revoke from AOP using
attributes of entities in the model. We have developed
admin users attribute functions (AATT) and admin roles
attribute functions (ARATT). Based on the need we
have observed, we have also introduced regular roles
attribute functions (RATT). We will later see that we
need attributes from different entities in representing
properties of RRA97 and UARBAC’s RRA in ARRA.
The attribute functions or simply attributes are defined
as mapping from its domain such as AU or AR to
its range. Range of an attribute att can be atomic or
set valued, which is specified by function attType. It
is derived from set of scope or atomic values denoted
by Scope(att). Furthermore, the scope of an attribute
can be either ordered or unordered, which is given by
a function called is_ordered(att). If it is ordered, we
must specify that attribute’s hierarchy denoted by Hatt
on its scope Scope(att). Hatt is a partial ordering on
Scope(att). Note that even in the case of a set valued
attribute att, the hierarchy Hatt is specified on Scope(att)
instead of 2Scope(att). We infer the ordering between two
set values given an ordering on atomic values. H*att in
Table I denotes the reflexive transitive closure of Hatt.
In ARRA, there are two ways by which an admin user
can select a set of regular roles for assignment to a target
regular role. The first way allows an admin user to select
a single role and a target role, and perform an admin
operation like assign or revoke. The second way allows
an admin user to select a set of regular roles, the target
role and perform similar operation on those roles. In the
latter case, the selection criteria for the set of regular
roles can be expressed using a set-builder notation whose
rule is based on the regular role attributes. For example,
is_authorizedRassign(au, {r1 | r1 ∈ ROLES ∧ Lead ∈
roleTitle(r1)}, r2) would specify a policy for an admin
user au that selects the set of all the roles with role
title Lead in order to assign those roles to a role r2.
Assigning a role r1 to role r2 make role r1 junior to r2,
i.e., it adds an entry <r2, r1> in RH. It is referred to as
edge insetion in RRA97.
Authorization rule is specified as a logical expression
on the attributes of admin users, admin roles, and that
of regular roles considered for assignment.
IV. MAPPING PRIOR RRA MODELS IN ARRA
In this section, we demonstrate that ARRA can intu-
itively simulate the features of prior RRA models. In par-
ticular, we have developed concrete algorithms that can
convert any instance of RRA97 and UARBAC’s RRA
into their corresponding equivalent ARRA instances.
Due to space limitation, we have included explicit ex-
ample instances for each of these prior models, their
manual translation into corresponding ARRA instances,
and detail description in as separate article [20]
A. RRA97 in ARRA
MapRRA97 (Algorithm 1) maps any RRA97 instance
into an equivalent ARRA instance. Labels 97 and A
represent sets and functions from RRA97 and ARRA, re-
spectively. MapRRA97 takes an instance of RRA97 as in-
put. In particular, input consists of USERS97, ROLES97,
AR97, AUA97, RH97, ARH97, and can_modify97. The
can_modify instruction covers operations for inserting an
edge, deleting an edge, creating a role and deleting a
role. ARRA model can simulate inserting an edge and
deleting an edge. However, creating and deleting roles
are beyond the scope of current ARRA model.
Output from MapRRA97 algorithm is an equivalent
ARRA instance with AUA, AOPA, ROLESA, AUAA,
RHA, ARHA, ARATTA, For each attribute att ∈
ARATTA, ScopeA(att), attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att)
and HAatt, For each admin role ar ∈ AR
A and for
TABLE I
ARRA MODEL
– AU, AOP, ROLES, AR are finite sets of administrative users, administrative operations such as assign and
revoke, regular roles and administrative roles, respectively.
– AUA ⊆ AU × AR, administrative user to administrative role assignment relation.
– RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, a partial ordering on the set ROLES.
– ARH ⊆ AR × AR, a partial ordering on the set AR.
– AATT, ARATT, and RATT are finite sets of administrative user attribute functions, administrative role
attribute functions, and regular role attribute functions, respectively.
– For each att in AATT ∪ ARATT ∪ RATT, Scope(att) is a finite set of atomic values from which the range
of the attribute function att is derived.
– attType : AATT ∪ ARATT ∪ RATT → {set, atomic}, which specifies whether the range of a given attribute
is atomic or set valued.
– Each attribute function maps elements in AU, AR and ROLES to atomic or set values.
∀aatt ∈ AATT. aatt : AU→


Scope(aatt) if attType(aatt) = atomic
2Scope(aatt) if attType(aatt) = set
∀aratt ∈ ARATT. aratt : AR→


Scope(aratt) if attType(aratt) = atomic
2Scope(aratt) if attType(aratt) = set
∀ratt ∈ RATT. ratt : ROLES→


Scope(ratt) if attType(ratt) = atomic
2Scope(ratt) if attType(ratt) = set
– is_ordered : AATT ∪ ARATT ∪ RATT → {True, False}, specifies if the scope is ordered for each of the
attributes.
– For each att ∈ AATT ∪ ARATT ∪ RATT,
if is_ordered(att) = True, Hatt ⊆ Scope(att) × Scope(att), a partially ordered attribute hierarchy, and Hatt 6= φ,
else, if is_ordered(att) = False, Hatt = φ
(For some att ∈ AATT ∪ ARATT ∪ RATT for which attType(att) = set and is_ordered(att) = True, if {a, b},
{c, d} ∈ 2Scope(att) (where a, b, c, d ∈ Scope(att)), we infer {a, b} ≥ {c, d} if (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)
∈ H*att.)
ARRA model allows an administrator to perform an operation on a single role or a set of roles at a time. The
authorization rule for performing an operation on a single role is as follows:
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedRop(au: AU, r1 : ROLES, r2 : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is
allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the regular roles r1 and the role r2.
Note that assigning a role r1 to r2 makes r1 junior to r2. This rule is written as a logical expression using
attributes of admin user au, admin role, ar, and regular role, r.
The authorization rule for performing an operation on a set of users is as follows:
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedRop(au: AU, χ : 2
ROLES, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is
allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the roles in the set χ and the role r.
Here χ is a set of roles that can be specified using a set-builder notation, whose rule is written using role
attributes.
each att ∈ ARATTA, att(ar), Authorization rule for
assign (auth_assign), and Authorization rule for revoke
(auth_revoke).
As indicated in MapRRA97, Step 1 maps sets from
RRA97 to ARRA sets. In Step 2, admin role attribute
is expressed. AATT and RATT are left empty as there
is no use case for these attributes in translating RRA97.
Admin role attribute authRange captures the mapping
between an authority range as defined in RRA97, and an
admin role. It is a set valued and unordered attribute with
its scope as a transitive closure of regular role hierarchy,
RH+. In ARRA, we use a symbolic representation of
an authority range with end points a and b, as (a, b).
However, whenever we need roles present in (a, b), we
denote the set of roles with ⌈a, b⌉, i.e., ⌈a, b⌉ = {r | r
∈ ROLESA ∧ a < r < b}.
In Step 3, we construct an authorization rule for insert
edge operation from can-modify97, which is equivalent
to is_authorizedRinsertEdge(au : AU
A, r1 : ROLES
A, r2
: ROLESA) in ARRA. This formula asserts assignment
conditions that preserves encapsulation for admin roles’
authority ranges. Similarly, In Step 4, authorization rule
equivalent to deleting an edge from can_modify97 is
expressed.
B. UARBAC’s RRA in ARRA
Algorithm 2 presents MapRRA-UARBAC that maps any
instance of UARBAC’s RRA [8] to its equivalent
ARRA instance. Labels U and A represent sets and
functions from UARBAC and ARRA, respectively.
Input to MapRRA-UARBAC consists of C
U, USERSU,
ROLESU, PU, RHU, AMU(role), For each u ∈ USERSU,
authorized_permsU[u], and For every r1, r2 ∈ ROLES
U,
grant operation grantRoleToRole(r1, r2) will be true if
the granter has either [role, r2, empower] and [role,
r1, grant] or, [role, r2, empower] and [role, grant]
or, [role, empower] and [role, r1, grant] or, [user,
empower] and [role, grant] permissions towards roles.
For each r1, r2 ∈ ROLES
U, revokeRoleFromUser(r1,
r2) is true if the granter has either [role, r2, empower]
and [role, r1, grant] or, [role, r1, admin] or, [role, r2,
admin] or, [role, admin] permission on roles.
MapRRA-UARBAC yields an ARRA instance consisting
of AUA, AOPA, ROLESA, ARA, AUAA, RHA, ARHA,
AATTA, For each attribute att ∈ AATTA, ScopeA(att),
attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att) and HAatt, For each user
au ∈ AUA and for each att ∈ AATTA, att(au), Autho-
rization rule for assign (auth_assign), and Authorization
rule for revoke (auth_revoke).
In Step 1 primary sets from UARBAC’s RRA are
mapped to AURA equivalent sets. In Step 2, admin user
Algorithm 1. MapRRA97
Input: RRA97 instance
Output: ARRA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. AUA ← USERS97
b. AOPA ← {insertEdge, deleteEdge}
c. ROLESA ← ROLES97 ; AUAA ← AUAU
b. RHA ← RH97
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in AURA */
a. AATTA ← {} ; RATTA ← {}
b. ARATTA ← {authRange}
c. ScopeA(authRange) = RH+ A
d. attTypeA(authRange) = set
e. is_orderedA(authRange) = False ; HAauthRange = φ
f. For each ar ∈ ARA, authRange(ar) = φ
g. For each (ar, (ri, rj)) ∈ can_modify
97,
authRange(ar) = authRange(ar) ∪ (ri, rj)
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. assign_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, (ri, rj)) ∈ can_modify
97,
assign_formula' = assign_formula ∨
(∃(au, ar1) ∈ AUA
A, ∃(s, t) ∈ authRange(ar1).
r1, r2 ∈ ⌈s, t⌉) ∧ ((∃(m, n), (m', n') ∈⋃
ar2∈ AR
authRange(ar2). r1, r2 ∈ ⌈m, n⌉ ∧ (⌈m', n'⌉
⊂ ⌈m, n⌉ → r1, r2 /∈ (m', n'))) ∨ (∃(x,y) ∈
⋃
ar3∈ AR
authRange(ar3). ((r1 = y ∧ r2 > x) ∨ (r2 = x ∧
r1 < y)) ∧ (∀p ∈ ⌈x, y⌉ ∧ ∀q /∈ ⌈x, y⌉. (<q, p> ∈
(RHA ∪ <r2, r1>)*↔ <q, y> ∈ (RH
A ∪ <r2, r1>)*)
∧ (<p, q> ∈ (RHA ∪ <r2, r1>)* ↔ <x, q> ∈ (RH
A
∪ <r2, r1>)*))))
c. auth_assign = is_authorizedRinsertEdge(au : AU
A,
r1 : ROLES
A, r2 : ROLES
A) ≡ assign_formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */
a. revoke_formula = φ
b. For each (ar1, (r1, r2)) ∈ can_modify
97,
revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨
∃(au, ar) ∈ AUAA ∧ ∃(x, y) ∈ authAR(ar). r1, r2
∈ (x, y) ∧ ∃(r1, r2) /∈
⋃
ar∈ AR
authRange(ar)
c. auth_revoke = is_authorizedRdeleteEdge(au : AU
A,
r1 : ROLES
A, r2 : ROLES
A) ≡ revoke_formula'
Algorithm 2. MapRRA-UARBAC
Input: Instance of RRA in UARBAC
Output: ARRA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. AUA ← USERSU ; AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
b. ROLESA ← ROLESU ; AUAA = φ
c. RHA ← RHU
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in AURA */
a. AATTA ← {grantAuth, empowerAuth, adminAuth,
roleClassAuth}, ARATTA = {}, RATTA = {}
b. ScopeA(grantAuth) = ROLESA,
c. attTypeA(grantAuth) = set
d. is_orderedA(grantAuth) = True, HAgrantAuth = RH
A
e. For each u in AUU, grantAuth(u) = φ
f. For each u in USERSU and
for each [role, r, grant] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
grantAuth(u)' = grantAuth(u) ∪ r
g. ScopeA(empowerAuth) = ROLESA,
h. attTypeA(empowerAuth) = set
i. is_orderedA(empowerAuth) = True,
j. HAempowerAuth = RH
A
k. For each u in AUU, empowerAuth(u) = φ
l. For each u in USERSU and
for each [role, r, empower]
∈ authorized_permsU[u],
empowerAuth(u)' = empowerAuth(u) ∪ r
m. ScopeA(adminAuth) = ROLESA
n. attTypeA(adminAuth) = set
o. is_orderedA(adminAuth) = True,
p. HAadminAuth = RH
A
q. For each u in USERSA, adminAuth(u) = φ
r. For each u in USERSU and
for each [role, r, admin] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
adminAuth(u)' = adminAuth(u) ∪ r
s. ScopeA(roleClassAuth) = AMU(role)
t. attTypeA(roleClassAuth) = set
u. is_orderedA(roleClassAuth) = False
v. HAroleClassAuth = φ
w. For each u in USERSA, roleClassAuth(u) = φ
x. For each u in USERSU
for each [c, am] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
roleClassAuth(u)'= roleClassAuth(u) ∪ am
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. assign_formula = (r1 ∈ grantAuth(au) ∧
r2 ∈ empowerAuth(au)) ∨ (r1 ∈ grantAuth(au) ∧
empower ∈ roleClassAuth(au)) ∨
(grant ∈ roleClassAuth(au) ∧
r2 ∈ empowerAuth(au)) ∨
(grant ∈ roleClassAuth(au) ∧
empower ∈ roleClassAuth(au))
Continuation of Algorithm 2. MapRRA-UARBAC
b. auth_assign =
is_authorizedUassign(au : AU
A, r1 : ROLES
A, r2
: ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */
a. revoke_formula = (r1 ∈ grantAuth(au) ∧
r2 ∈ empowerAuth(au)) ∨ r1 ∈ adminAuth(au) ∨
r2 ∈ adminAuth(au)∨ admin ∈ roleClassAuth(au)
b. auth_revoke =
is_authorizedUrevoke(au1 : AU
A, r1 : ROLES
A, r2
: ROLESA) ≡ revoke_formula
attributes are defined. In UARBAC model, assignment
decisions of role to role are based on the admin user’s
access modes such as grant, empower and admin
towards regular roles. It treats each entity in the RBAC
system such as files, roles and users as objects. We
define admin user attributes grantAuth, empowerAuth
and adminAuth to capture an admin user’s access modes
on regular role, respectively. For example, grantAuth
yields a set of roles over which, an admin user has
grant access mode. Attribute roleClassAuth specifies the
form of class level access mode an admin user has on
role class. Class level access mode on role class for
instance gives an admin user authority with particular
access mode over all the available roles.
In Step 3, an authorization rule equivalent to
grantRoleToRole(r1, r2) from UARBAC is expressed.
In ARRA it is represented by is_authorizedRassign(au :
AUA, r1 : ROLES
A, r2 : ROLES
A), which is equal to
assign_formula. Similarly, in Step 4, authorization rule
for revoke equivalent to revokeRoleFromRole(r1, r2) is
constructed using attributes of an admin user.
C. An Example Instance for ARRA with role attributes
Previous ARRA model simulation examples did not
include regular role attribute. In this section, we present
a simple yet plausible example that demonstrates a use
case for role attributes in assigning a role to a role.
There are two admin users, Sam and Tom, and regular
roles IT Director, Development Manager, Quality
Manager, Marketing Manager, Finance Manager,
Support Engineer and System Analyst. There can be
many other roles in an organization. We have considered
few roles enough to illustrate our case. Admin user
attribute dept captures admin user’s authority over set of
departments. Although, it is likely that departments have
hierarchy in practice, we have not included department
hierarchy for simplicity. There are three departments in
the organization, namely, Operations, Account and IT.
Sam has admin authority over all the departments while
Tom has authority over IT department only. There is a
regular role attribute dept for mapping regular roles to
their departments.
Authorization condition is that if an admin user au
with admin role ar was given authority over a department
d and if roles r1 and r2 belonged to the same department
d then r1 can be assigned to r2.
Sets
– AU = {Sam, Tom}, AOP = {assign, revoke}
– ROLES = {IT Director, Development Mgr., Quality
Mgr., Marketing Mgr., Finance Mgr.,
Support Engineer, System Analyst}
– AR = {}, AUA = {}, RH = {}, ARH = {}
Attributes and functions
– AATT = {dept},
– Scope(dept) = {Operations, Account, IT},
attType(dept) = set, is_ordered(dept) = False,
Hdept = φ
– dept(Sam) = {Operations, Account, IT},
dept(Tom) = {IT}
– ARATT = {}, RATT = {dept, level}
– Scope(dept) = {Operations, Account, IT},
attType(dept) = atomic,
is_ordered(dept) = False, Hdept = φ
– dept(IT Director) = IT,
dept(Marketing Mgr.) = Operations,
dept(QA Mgr.) = IT, dept(Development Mgr.) = IT,
Authorization functions
– is_authorizedRassign(au : AU, r1 : ROLES, r2 : ROLES)
≡ ∃d ∈ Scope(dept). dept(au) = dept(r1) = dept(r2)
– is_authorizedRrevoke(au : AU, r1 : ROLES, r2 : ROLES)
≡ is_authorizedRassign(au : AU, r1 : ROLES, r2 :
ROLES)
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented ARRA, a model for
attribute based role-role assignment. A design motivation
behind ARRA model was to make it enough to express
prior RRA models. In particular, we took RRA97 and
UARBAC’s RRA model as foundation. For these mod-
els, we have presented MapRRA97 and MapRRA-UARBAC
algorithms, which map any instances of these models to
equivalent ARRA instances, respectively.
ARRA model can not only express existing RRA
models but also has a capability to do more. For instance,
prior models included in our research did not fit the no-
tion of regular role attributes. However, we acknowledge
that it is an essential attribute in making role assignment
decisions to say the least. Motivated by this notion, we
presented a simple example scenario where we made use
of regular role attributes for role-role assignment.
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